Human Rights in State Courts
An Overview and Recommendations for Legal Advocacy
Acknowledgments

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About
The Opportunity Agenda

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Introduction to the 2008 Edition

Since the last version of this report was released in 2007, state court decisions utilizing and interpreting international human rights law have increased in both number and depth of consideration. This publication includes cases that have been decided since the last edition, as well as cases that were not included previously. Some highlights of state court cases in the past year that have utilized international human rights law are:

- The California Supreme Court cited the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and American Convention on Human Rights in its declaration that marriage is a fundamental interest of the individual and not the state.¹
- A Florida District Court of Appeal discussed at length the strength of international law and opinion in the modern construction of the Eighth Amendment in its decision that ultimately sided with the state legislature in upholding the sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders.²

Additionally, some significant cases not included in the previous edition include:

- The Maryland Supreme Court relied heavily on the Nuremberg Code in finding a greater duty toward subjects for researchers conducting nontherapeutic programs.³
- A Montana Supreme Court concurrence drew upon the international origin of the “human dignity” clause of the Montana constitution to conclude that Montana University’s policy of denying benefits to same-sex partners was unconstitutional.⁴
- A dissenting Illinois Supreme Court opinion cited the European Convention and decisions from the British Commonwealth holding that the length of 15 years on death row without a clear end was cruel and unusual.⁵

In state courts, international human rights law continues to have persuasive authority for the interpretation of state constitutions, statutes, and common law.

Advocates have significantly increased their use of international human rights law on behalf of their clients, despite the often minimal treatment the courts give to international human rights authority. Particularly in adult death penalty cases, defendants have used many arguments incorporating international human rights law against the use of the death penalty; despite those efforts, defendants have not been successful to date.⁶ However, state courts may be demonstrating an increasing willingness to engage international human rights law in their decisions, as shown through their increasing depth of and openness to analysis of international law. As courts become more amenable to international viewpoints, opportunities for persuasive and new approaches in state courts will continue to reveal themselves.

¹. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 819 n.41 (Cal. 2008).
Human rights are a crucial part of the United States’ legal and cultural foundation. The founders of our country declared that we are all created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights. The United States helped to craft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the international human rights system after World War II and the horrors of the Holocaust. The notion of human rights has been central to our nation’s struggles to achieve equality and justice for all.

Yet, despite that legacy, international human rights laws have not played a major role in legal efforts to pursue fundamental rights, justice, and equality in the United States. That trend has begun to shift over the last decade, as more and more legal advocates have begun to incorporate human rights arguments into their work, and as the U.S. Supreme Court, in particular, has increasingly cited human rights law as persuasive authority for important constitutional decisions. ⁷

The federal courts, however, are in flux when it comes to the consideration of individual rights in general and human rights in particular. Federal constitutional and legislative protections tend not to include economic, social, and cultural rights that are an important part of the international human rights system. State courts, by contrast, often consider such protections and, in interpreting state law, have the independence to recognize a broader panoply of rights. In addition, state courts have authority to interpret international treaties, including human rights treaties.

Recognizing this important and underutilized opportunity, this report details the ways in which state courts have considered and interpreted international human rights law. It is intended for public interest lawyers and state court litigators, and also for state and municipal policy makers interested in integrating compliance with international human rights law into their domestic policies. ⁸


Some highlights of state court decisions that draw upon international human rights law include:

- California courts citing the UDHR to support their interpretation of the right to practice one’s trade, the right to privacy, the meaning of “physical handicap,” the right to freedom of movement, and the scope of welfare provisions;\(^9\)
- A Maryland Supreme Court relying heavily on the Nuremberg Code to find a greater duty toward subjects for researchers conducting nontherapeutic programs.\(^10\)
- A Missouri Supreme Court decision citing the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in striking down the juvenile death penalty;\(^11\)
- The New Hampshire Supreme Court relying on the ICCPR and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in its interpretation of parental rights under the state constitution;\(^12\)
- New York courts invoking the UDHR in cases involving the rights to work and to strike, a transnational discovery dispute, and the act of state doctrine;\(^13\)
- The Oregon Supreme Court looking to the UDHR, ICCPR, and European Convention to interpret the meaning of the state constitution’s provision on the treatment of prisoners;\(^14\)
- A Pennsylvania trial court reviewing the state’s failure to provide a 15-year-old defendant with schooling while in custody in light of the UDHR;\(^15\)
- The Utah Supreme Court using the ICCPR to help define constitutional standards for the treatment of prisoners;\(^16\)
- The Washington Supreme Court looking to the UDHR to reject Seattle’s residency requirements for civil-service position applicants;\(^17\)
- The West Virginia Supreme Court invoking the UDHR to review the financing scheme for public schools and to define the right to education;\(^18\)
- A concurring opinion in a Connecticut Supreme Court case that looked to the UDHR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to determine the scope of government’s obligations to provide for the poor;\(^19\)


A concurring opinion in a Florida Supreme Court case that invoked the ICCPR and struck down the juvenile death penalty;20

Dissenting Michigan Supreme Court opinions invoking the ICCPR to interpret the meaning of the Michigan constitution’s double jeopardy clause and citing the UDHR to interpret the meaning of the establishment clause;21 and

Dissenting and concurring Nevada Supreme Court opinions arguing that customary international law prohibits the execution of minors and invoking the ICCPR to challenge the juvenile death penalty.22

These decisions—described in further detail below—use human rights law as persuasive authority in interpreting state constitutions, statutes, and common law.

Part I of this report identifies strategies for and hurdles to the development of a human rights jurisprudence at the state level, which advocates should consider in crafting their arguments. Part II summarizes state court experiences with human rights. Although the discussion does not identify every single decision in which a state court has discussed international human rights law, it is fairly comprehensive. Part III proposes a strategy for further development of a jurisprudence of human rights in state courts.

The following abbreviations are used in this report:

- American Convention: American Convention on Human Rights
- American Declaration: American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
- CAT: Convention Against Torture
- CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
- CERD: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
- CRC: International Convention on the Rights of the Child
- ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
- UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Committee

PART I: Strategies for Using Human Rights in State Courts and Possible Complications

State courts can draw upon a number of arguments to support their use of international human rights principles in decision making. Under article VI, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, treaties are the “supreme Law of the Land,” binding on the “Judges in every State.” The United States has signed and ratified the ICCPR and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and is therefore bound by these treaties.

Implementation of these treaties and their principles is the responsibility of federal, state, and local government. Under the federal system, states are responsible for regulating areas of substantive law, including criminal, family, and social welfare law. The reservations the U.S. Senate issued when it ratified the treaties make clear that states are responsible for implementing international human rights law in these areas. State court incorporation of human rights principles is thus crucial to ensuring implementation at the state level.

Although the treaties are “non-self-executing”—meaning that they cannot be directly enforced in U.S. courts—they impose concrete obligations on states. Ratified treaties “have a legal status equivalent to enacted federal statutes;” they prevail over previously enacted federal statutory law (when there is a conflict) and over any inconsistent state or local law.

23. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction.” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).

24. Because of the United States’ federal system, “when the United States assents to a treaty or other international agreement, . . . implementation [must] occur [at] the state as well as the federal level. If states fail to implement international treaty provisions that address areas traditionally reserved to them, the United States cannot, as a practical matter, achieve compliance with the treaty provisions to which it is party.” Davis, supra note 2, at 361-64.

25. Senate ratification of major treaties has been accompanied by the following understanding: “That the United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments; to the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant.” Id. at 363 (citing 138 Cong. Rec. 8068, 8071 (1992) (understanding for International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); 140 Cong. Rec. 14326, 14326 (1994) (same understanding for International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination); 136 Cong. Rec. S17486, S17486 (1990) (same understanding for Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment)).


In ratifying the ICCPR, the Senate mandated that its protections go no further than corresponding protections in domestic law. Advocates and scholars have argued that such a reservation frustrates the purpose of the treaty and may be invalid under international law and therefore unenforceable—although the rest of the treaty may be severable and continue to have legal effect. But state courts routinely invoke Senate reservations to deny individuals’ claims under treaties like the ICCPR. Despite such reservations, international and U.S. law requires courts to interpret both state and federal law so that it does not conflict with ratified treaties. And as a signatory to covenants and conventions like the ICESCR and the CRC, the United States must “refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.” Furthermore, when human rights principles rise to the level of customary international law, meaning they are “practices and beliefs that are so vital and intrinsic a part of a social and economic system that they are treated as if they were laws,” they do not require implementing legislation to be binding in the United States. Customary international law is part of federal common law, and, as such, it displaces conflicting state laws.

Most importantly, courts can look to international human rights treaties for interpretive guidance, whether or not the treaties are signed, ratified, or considered customary international law. Specifically, courts can turn to international human rights law to help clarify the meaning of vague or unsettled domestic law. Even if human rights principles are not directly binding, they can influence courts as they define and explain statutory provisions, and as they give meaning to domestic constitutional rights. Courts have looked to unratified, as well as ratified, treaties for this purpose.

29. 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01, S4783 (1992) (attaching a reservation to the ICCPR and stating “that the United States considers itself bound by article 7 to the extent that ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States”).

30. See, e.g., Penny White, Legal, Political, and Ethical Hurdles to Applying International Human Rights Law in the State Courts of the United States (and Arguments for Scaling Them), 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 937, 950-51, 967-69 (2003) (arguing that state judges have an independent authority to interpret the underlying treaties and reservations).

31. See, e.g., People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 103 (Ill. 2002) (reservations to ICCPR); State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St. 3d 72, 103-04 (Ohio 1995) (noting that the U.S. approved the Charter of the Organization of American States with a reservation “that none of its provisions shall be considered as limiting the powers of the several states with respect to any matters recognized under the Constitution as being within the reserved powers of the several states”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); People v. Cook, 39 Cal. 4th 14566, 620 (Cal. 2006) (reservations to ICCPR); People v. Brown, 33 Cal. 4th 382, 403-04 (Cal. 2004) (same). But see Servin v. State, 117 Nev. 775, 794-95 (Nev. 2001) (Rose, J., concurring) (raising concerns about the validity of a reservation to the ICCPR regarding the execution of juveniles); Dominguez v. State, 114 Nev. 783, 786-87 (Nev. 1998) (Rose, J., dissenting) (insisting in a juvenile death penalty decision that the defendant’s case be remanded to the lower court for a determination of the validity of a Senate reservation to the ICCPR).

32. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). (“It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.”) See also Maria Foscarinis, Realizing Domestic Social Justice Through International Human Rights: Part II: Advocating for the Human Right to Housing: Notes from the United States, 30 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 447, 478 n.20 (2006).


37. See, e.g., White, supra note 23, at 973 (“State appellate courts, in applying state law, are free to utilize international treaty provisions and customary international law in making” decisions as to the content of constitutional guarantees).
PART II: International Human Rights in State Courts

The following state by state discussion examines the role international human rights law has played in state court decisions. There are virtually no cases in which state courts have relied solely on international human rights law to reach a decision. Rather, state courts most often turn to international human rights law when it is offered as an interpretive guide for the development of rights enumerated in state constitutions or statutes.

Alabama

State courts in Alabama have addressed international human rights law primarily in the criminal context. In a 2000 decision the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the juvenile death penalty, rejecting an international law argument made by the defendant. The court held that the ICCPR was not self-executing and did not create a private right of action in U.S. courts. It dismissed the defendant’s argument that the U.S. Senate reservation upon which the court based its decision was invalid. And it rejected the defendant’s arguments under the CERD and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), noting that when the United States ratified those treaties it specifically stated that international law did not prohibit the juvenile death penalty.

Following the 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons, in which the U.S. Supreme Court invoked international human rights law and invalidated the juvenile death penalty, however, Alabama courts have overturned at least two juvenile death penalty cases, finding the convictions in violation of international treaties.

In the nonjuvenile context, at least one defendant has tried (and failed) to invoke international human rights law in the context of a habeas petition in Alabama state court. In Wood v. State the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected as nonjurisdictional a defendant’s argument that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the ICCPR and the CERD. More recently,

38. Ex parte Pressley, 770 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 2000); see also Wynn v. State, 804 So. 2d 1122 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (addressing the ICCPR and the death penalty by adopting the Pressley reasoning as its own); Ex parte Carroll, 852 So. 2d 821 (Ala. 2001) (same).
39. Pressley, 770 So. 2d at 148-49.
40. Id.
42. Adams v. State, Case No. CR-98-0496, 2003 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 212 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2003) (addressing the ICCPR and upholding the juvenile death penalty), overturned on appeal, 2005 Ala. LEXIS 217, 1030633 (Ala. Dec. 23, 2005) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)). See also Duncan v. State, 925 So. 2d 245, 276-77 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2005) (“The appellant’s third argument is that the sentence of death, which was imposed for a crime he committed when he was 17 years old, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and violates several international treaties and covenants. Based on Roper . . . we are compelled to agree . . . ”).
in 2008, a defendant unsuccessfully argued that the lengthy incarceration time spent by death row inmates constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is a violation of the ICCPR.\(^4^4\) The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals ruled, as it did in *Ex parte Pressley*, that, because it is a non-self-executing treaty, the ICCPR did not provide the defendant an individual right of action to bring this claim.

**Arkansas**

The Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the ICCPR to the juvenile death penalty in *dicta* in *McFarland v. State*.\(^4^5\) The court pronounced the defendant’s reliance on the treaty “novel,” but declared it “meritless,” observing that “the treaty signed by the president provides that persons under age eighteen may be sentenced to death.”\(^4^6\) In any event, the court noted that the argument was moot, as McFarland had not been sentenced to death.

**Arizona**

Arizona courts have not yet utilized international human rights law in their decisions; however, two recent cases may be an indication that this will change. First, in the Arizona Supreme Court case *State v. Tucker*, a death penalty defendant was able to reserve his claim that the death penalty was a violation of international law for federal review.\(^4^7\) Two weeks later the Arizona Supreme Court noted in its decision that death penalty counsels have a duty to “take advantage of all appropriate opportunities to argue why death is not suitable punishment for their particular client,”\(^4^8\) which demands that counsels are “intimately familiar with . . . the substantive state, federal, and international law governing death penalty cases.”\(^4^9\)

**California**

California state courts have significant experience with international human rights law in both civil and criminal contexts. In a few cases, courts have demonstrated willingness to use treaties and customary international law to develop state constitutional and statutory protections.

In a 1952 case, *Sei Fujii v. California*,\(^5^0\) the California Supreme Court refused to apply the nondiscrimination guarantees of the United Nations Charter to invalidate the California Alien Land Law, which denied immigrants the right to own land in the state. The court inquired into the “intent of the signatory parties” to determine whether the provisions of the charter were self-executing.\(^5^1\) It held that they were not; although the charter’s “humane and enlightened objectives” warranted “respectful consideration by the courts,” its language “lack[ed] the mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate an intent to create justiciable rights in private persons immediately upon ratification.”\(^5^2\)


\(^{45}\) 337 Ark. 386, 399-400 (Ark. 1999).

\(^{46}\) Id. at 399 (emphasis in original).

\(^{47}\) *State v. Tucker*, 215 Ariz. 298, 324 (Ariz. 2007) (en banc).

\(^{48}\) *State v. Garza*, 216 Ariz. 56, 71 n.16 (Ariz. 2007) (en banc) (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES GUIDELINE § 10.11(L) (2003)).

\(^{49}\) Id. at 71 n.16 (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES GUIDELINE § 1.1 cmt (2003)) (emphasis added).

\(^{50}\) 38 Cal. 2d 718 (Cal. 1952).

\(^{51}\) Id. at 721.

\(^{52}\) Id. at 724.
In its 1971 decision in *Bixby v. Pierno*, however, the California Supreme Court looked more favorably at international human rights law, citing the UDHR, among other authorities, to support its statement that the California constitution protects the right to practice one’s trade or profession. In 1980 two relevant cases came before the Court: *Santa Barbara v. Adamson*, in which the California Supreme Court again invoked the UDHR, this time to interpret a state law protecting privacy; and *Conservatorship of Hofferber*, in which the Supreme Court cited two UN subcommittee hearings in support of its conclusion that the state has a compelling interest in preventing the inhumane treatment of mentally disturbed persons when involuntary confinement is prescribed for them. Two years later, in *American National Life Insurance Company v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission*, the court relied on the UDHR to construe the definition of “physical handicap” in an antidiscrimination statute.

Courts of appeal in California have also drawn extensively on international human rights law. The Fifth District Court of Appeal cited the UDHR in its 1979 decision in *In re White* to support its determination that the California constitution guaranteed freedom of movement within the state. And in its 1986 decision in *Boehm v. Superior Court*, the Fifth District Court of Appeal relied heavily on international law for guidance in interpreting the state’s welfare statute. The plaintiffs here had challenged the county defendant’s planned reduction of welfare assistance payments as a violation of the state’s welfare statute. The Court of Appeal held that the statute required the county to provide for minimum subsistence and relied on the UDHR to determine what that entailed. The court concluded that “it defies common sense and all notions of human dignity to exclude from minimum subsistence allowances for clothing, transportation, and medical care.” The court added that “to leave recipients without minimum medical assistance is inhumane and shocking to the conscience.”

In a 2004 case, *C & C Construction, Inc. v. Sacramento Municipal Utility District*, the Third District Court of Appeal contrasted the meaning of discrimination in the CERD with the meaning of discrimination under the state constitution. In *C & C Construction* the plaintiff contractor sued the district, alleging that its race-based affirmative action program violated the state constitution. The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the definition of discrimination in the state constitution (as amended by Proposition 209) prohibited the state from classifying individuals by race or gender. The court noted that section 8315, enacted during the pendency of the appeal, attempted to change the definition of discrimination in the California constitution to be consistent with the definition in the CERD. Section 8315 quoted the CERD, which recognizes that “special measures” such as affirmative action “may be necessary in order to ensure . . . equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The court rejected the definition of discrimination in section 8315 as “ineffective” and criticized the state’s legislature and governor for failing to comply with the proper procedures for amending the state constitution.

53. 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143 n.9, 145 n.12 (Cal. 1971).
54. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130 n.2 (Cal. 1980).
55. 28 Cal. 3d 161, 172 n.9 (Cal. 1980).
56. 32 Cal. 3d 603, 608 n.4 (Cal. 1982); see also Wong v. Tenneco, 702 P.2d 570, 581 (Cal. 1985) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing UDHR); Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 29-30 (Cal. 1948) (Carter, J., concurring) (citing UN Charter).
57. 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 149 n.4 (Cal.Ct. App. 1979); see also In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 868 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (citing law review article on CEDAW and Islamic law).
59. 178 Cal. App. 3d at 496.
60. 178 Cal. App. 3d at 502.
61. Id.
62. Id.
64. Id. at 301 (citing CERD) (internal quotations omitted).
More recently, in 2007, the Third District Court of Appeal considered a similar case, Connerly v. Schwarzenegger, and cited C & C Construction in its discussion. In Connerly the plaintiff sought a declaration that section 8315 was in conflict with the state constitution and therefore invalid.65 The Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on the grounds that there was no justiciable controversy surrounding the statute, because section 8315 had been successfully challenged in C & C Construction and a final decision by an appellate court had rendered the statute null and void.66 Later that year, in considering the case Coral Const., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco,67 the First District Court of Appeal cited C & C Construction and noted that although the “CERD [Committee] views [CERD] . . . as requiring adoption of race-based remedies in the face of persistent inequities . . . the State Department interprets the companion provisions as calling for a permissive approach . . . the State Department’s interpretation is reasonable and accordingly we accord it great deference.”68 The court further noted that the CERD’s language is reconcilable with the State Department’s interpretation, because the CERD does not mandate race-conscious remedial programs. Rather such programs will not violate the CERD’s definition of discrimination.69

However, in the context of voluntary school-desegregation plans, where the legal effect of Proposition 209 remains unclear,71 a 2004 California superior court upheld the constitutionality of a “race-conscious” school assignment plan to voluntarily desegregate the school district.72 The court stated that the proposed application of Proposition 209 by plaintiffs opposing the plan would be “inconsistent with [section] 8315 which provides that ‘Racial discrimination’ or ‘discrimination on the basis of race’ . . . shall have the same meaning . . . as defined and used in” the CERD.73 The court further highlighted that section 4 of the CERD recognizes that the use of race-conscious plans may be necessary, so that racial and minority groups may have the “equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms,” and these measures “shall not be deemed racial discrimination.”74

Finally, in 2008, the California Supreme Court cited the UDHR, the European Convention, the American Convention, and “the constitutions of many nations” in its landmark decision In re Marriage Cases.75 The court cited the ICCPR, the European Convention, the American Convention, and “the constitutions of many nations throughout the world” to support its decision that marriage is a constitutionally protected, fundamental human interest belonging to the individual and not the state.76 Over the past 20 years California courts have also repeatedly interpreted and applied international human rights law in criminal cases. In a 1987 case, People v. Ghent, the defendant relied on various UN resolutions in challenging the death penalty law as inconsistent with “principles of international human rights law.”77 The California Supreme Court rejected these arguments, finding that international resolutions and treaties have no domestic effect without implementing legislation from

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66. Id.
68. Id. at 790.
69. Id. at 793.
70. Id.
71. Only one California case has been published on the subject, but the case turned on the specific characteristics of the plan. See Crawford v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1278 (2002).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 43 Cal. 4th 757, 818 (Cal. 2008).
76. Id. at 819 n.41.
77. 43 Cal. 3d 739, 778 (Cal. 1987).
Almost 15 years later, in *People v. Hillhouse*, the California Supreme Court denied that the ICCPR, American Declaration, and CERD prohibited the death penalty, ruling: “International law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.” In a 2004 case, *People v. Brown*, the California Supreme Court again upheld the California death penalty statute against the defendant’s charge that it violated the ICCPR. The court noted that the U.S. Senate had attached a reservation to the treaty expressly reserving states’ rights to impose the death penalty.

In 2006 the California Supreme Court reiterated its position that, given the U.S. government’s reservation to the ICCPR, “international law does not bar imposing a death sentence that was rendered in accord with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.” And in *People v. Boyer* the court found that the defendant was not denied his right to a fair trial under the UDHR, ICCPR, and American Declaration, where the court found no errors under state or federal law whose cumulative effect was prejudicial. Similarly, in *People v. Perry* the California Supreme Court reasserted that the state’s death penalty law did not violate the ICCPR, given the U.S. reservations to the treaty, and also held that the imposition of capital punishment in California did not violate international norms. In *People v. Ramirez* the court cited its previous decisions and summarily rejected the defendant’s claims that he was denied the right to a fair trial under the UDHR, ICCPR, and American Declaration, and UDHR and was subjected to racial discrimination in violation of customary international law. In 2007 in *People v. Prince*, the California Supreme Court again cited its previous decisions and summarily rejected the defendant’s claim that the various violations of state and federal law he raised also constituted a violation of the ICCPR. The defendant in *People v. Morgan*, another case of 2007, asserted that the death penalty violates international law. Specifically, he claimed that California’s death sentencing scheme violates the ICCPR, that the application of the death penalty in this specific case would be a violation of “international norms of humanity and decency reflected in the laws and practices of most civilized nations,” and that California, as one among the minority of jurisdictions in the world that apply the death penalty, violates the Eighth Amendment. In dismissing these claims, the court reiterated that the death penalty is valid under international law so long as the sen-

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78. Id. at 779 (citing Sei Fujii, 38 Cal. 2d at 724-25).
79. 27 Cal. 4th 469, 511 (Cal. 2002).
80. 33 Cal. 4th 382, 403-04 (Cal. 2004); see also People v. Turner, 34 Cal. 4th 406, 439-40 (2004) (citing *Brown* to reject an attempt to use the ICCPR).
81. Id. at 404 (“Given states' sovereignty in such matters within constitutional limitations, our federal system of government effectively compelled such a reservation”).
83. 38 Cal. 4th 412, 489-90 (Cal. 2006).
84. 38 Cal. 4th 302, 322 (Cal. 2006).
85. 39 Cal. 4th 398, 479 (Cal. 2006); see also People v. Cornwell, 37 Cal. 4th 50, 105-06 (Cal. 2005) (finding that defendant's claims under the ICCPR and the UDHR lacked merit); People v. Harris, 37 Cal. 4th 310, 366 (Cal. 2005).
86. 40 Cal. 4th 1179, 1299 (Cal. 2007) (citing People v. Cornwell, 37 Cal. 4th 50, 106 (2005); see also People v. Brasure, 42 Cal. 4th 1037, 1072 (Cal. 2008) (court declines to reconsider its previous decision that the death penalty statute does not violate the ICCPR). Defendant Prince also raised claims of general violations of international law with no specific reference to a source of international law. People v. Brown, 33 Cal. 4th 382, 404 (Cal. 2004).
87. 42 Cal. 4th 593, 627 (Cal. 2007).
88. Id. at 627-8.
89. Id. (citing People v. Moon, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 47 (2005)). Interestingly, in *People v. Moon* the Supreme Court acknowledged that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is not a “static concept.” However, the Court was not convinced that the abolition of the death penalty in Western Europe and the abolishment of the death penalty for crimes committed as a juvenile sufficient to *per se* rule the death penalty as unconstitutional, because no “national consensus has emerged against the death penalty.” 3 Cal. 4th at 47.
tencing is compliant with state and federal constitutions and statutory requirements.\textsuperscript{90} In 2008 the court once again dismissed a death penalty defendant’s claim that his trial and sentencing violated the UDHR, ICCPR, American Declaration, and CERD.\textsuperscript{91}

Death penalty defendants have also used international human rights law to challenge other judicial processes in their cases.\textsuperscript{92} In 2006 in People v. Lewis & Oliver, defendant Oliver claimed that the physical restraints he had to wear before and during his trial violated the UDHR.\textsuperscript{93} The California Supreme Court found that Oliver’s claim lacked merit, because the trial court’s shackling orders did not violate applicable state or federal law, and because Oliver had failed to show how international law differed from domestic law on the issue.\textsuperscript{94} In 2007 the defendant in People v. Leonard failed to show merit under the California constitution in his claims of procedural errors, a juror dismissal error, and the competence of defendant determination error at the guilt and penalty phase of his trial. The defendant sought to claim that the same errors were also in violation of the ICCPR, American Declaration, American Convention, European Convention, and the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment adopted by the UN.\textsuperscript{95} The California Supreme Court, however, ruled that these international claims lacked merit, because the defendant did not show that his rights under these agreements exceeded those provided for by California law.\textsuperscript{96} Three months later, in People v. Alfaro, the defendant claimed that she was denied the right to a fair trial, protection against arbitrary deprivation of life, and discriminatory application of state criminal law as established by customary international law, as well as by the UDHR, ICCPR, and American Declaration.\textsuperscript{97} The California Supreme Court assumed, without a decision, that the defendant had standing to evoke these international instruments; however, it ultimately denied her claims, since she had been afforded a fair trial and had not been subjected to racial discrimination.\textsuperscript{98} The California Supreme Court also reiterated that “international law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.”\textsuperscript{99}

In two unpublished opinions the California Supreme Court weighed in on the applicability of international human rights law in the juvenile offender context. In People v. Bell the court decided that a life sentence without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender does not violate international law, and while international consensus against such a sentence is instructive, it is not controlling.\textsuperscript{100} Furthermore, in a case resulting in a life sentence with the possibility of parole, the defendant cited

\textsuperscript{90} Id. at 628.

\textsuperscript{91} 41 Cal. 4th 872, 295 (Cal. 2008) (defendant failed to establish that any aspect of his trial or penalty determination involved violations of state or federal constitutional law); see also People v. Wilson, 43 Cal. 4th 1, 33 (Cal. 2008) (the court declined to reconsider its previous decision that the death penalty does not violate the ICCPR, because it is not used as a regular form of punishment that is contrary to international norms of human decency).

\textsuperscript{92} See also People v. Tafoya, 42 Cal. 4th 147, 199 (Cal. 2007) (defendant raised claims for violations of international law in death penalty case, but the court opinion did not specifically cite any sources of international law, using only the general term international law).

\textsuperscript{93} 39 Cal. 4th 970, 1032 n.21 (Cal. 2006) (citing People v. Blair, 36 Cal. 4th 686, 755 (Cal. 2005) (finding that defendant had failed to establish a violation of international law where no federal or state laws were violated)).

\textsuperscript{94} Id.

\textsuperscript{95} 40 Cal. 4th 1370, 1430 (Cal. 2007).

\textsuperscript{96} Id.

\textsuperscript{97} 41 Cal. 4th 1277, 1332 (Cal. 2007).

\textsuperscript{98} Id.

\textsuperscript{99} Id.

the CRC and *Roper v. Simmons* in his argument that the punishment was cruel and unusual. However, the California Supreme Court found the argument, though successful in the juvenile death penalty context, insufficient in the context of a life sentence with the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender. It stated: “These authorities are so far removed from the present circumstances” that they do not apply to her because his sentence is much more proportional, given that he has been granted the possibility of parole.

Furthermore, at least one concurring opinion and one dissent in criminal cases in California cited international human rights law. In *Cramer v. Tyars* California Supreme Court Justice Frank Newman dissented, finding that the trial court violated the state constitution by requiring a defendant who suffered from “severe and irreversible mental retardation” to respond to questioning that might incriminate him. Justice Newman cited the UDHR and found the treatment of the defendant “cruel and degrading.” In a concurrence in *People v. Levins* Justice Newman noted his agreement that the defendant had a right to a postindictment preliminary examination, pointing to amicus briefs by the ACLU suggesting that the court consider the UDHR and the ICCPR, as well as to articles citing the CERD.

From March 2007 to June 2008 another 10 cases were heard by the California Supreme Court in which defendants unsuccessfully argued that the death penalty is a violation of international law. These opinions did not make any references to specific sources of international human rights law; rather the defendants raised general violations of international law in three distinct ways. Several defendants argued that their sentences were “violations of international law” generally, which the Supreme Court summarily dismissed by citing its previous cases and repeatedly stating that international law does not bar the imposition of a death sentence, so long as the death sentence is rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements. Another contention made by defendants was that the use of the death penalty as a “regular form of punishment” is a violation of international law. However, the California Supreme Court rejected this line of argument, asserting that California’s death penalty is not a regular form of punishment because it is used only for the crime of first-degree murder where special circumstances are found true. The third argument raised by defendants used international norms of human decency and Western Europe’s abolishment of the death penalty to claim a violation of the Eighth Amendment; the California Supreme Court also rejected this argument under the same reasoning it used to dismiss the argument that the death penalty is a regular form of punishment.

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102. *Id.*
103. 23 Cal. 3d 131, 151 n.1 (Cal. 1979) (Newman, J., dissenting).
104. 22 Cal. 3d 620, 625 (Cal. 1978) (Newman, J., concurring).
107. *People v. Bell*, 40 Cal. 4th 582, 621 (Cal. 2007); see also *People v. Abilez*, 41 Cal. 4th 472, 535 (Cal. 2007) (citing *Bell*, 40 Cal. 4th at 621).
**Connecticut**

Former Chief Justice Ellen Peters of the Connecticut Supreme Court has been a proponent of the important role that state courts can play, and have played to date, in safeguarding human rights.\(^{108}\) In a 1995 concurrence in *Moore v. Ganim*,\(^{109}\) Justice Peters relied on the ICESCR and the UDHR to differ with the majority and interpret the Connecticut constitution to require a minimal social welfare safety net for the poor.\(^{110}\) She looked to the UDHR and the ICESCR, among other sources, to support her contention that “contemporary considerations of law and policy” mandate governmental responsibility to provide for the poor.\(^{111}\) Although the United States is not a party to the ICESCR, she noted that it represented “wide international agreement on at least the hortatory goals” contained within.\(^{112}\) The majority opinion did not address international human rights law.

In other Connecticut cases, human rights law has received a mixed reception. In a 1972 Connecticut Supreme Court case, a plaintiff argued that a number of international affirmations of antidiscrimination, including the precursor to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), prohibited the Connecticut state bar from refusing to admit her on the grounds that she was a foreign national.\(^{113}\) The court eschewed a discussion of her international law arguments in its rejection of her claim.\(^{114}\) In *Batista v. Battista*, an unreported decision, a superior court judge expressed “great concern and embarrassment” that the United States had not signed the CRC and nonetheless used the convention as a guide for her custody determination.\(^{115}\) In *Belic v. Amtrak*, also an unreported decision, another superior court judge refused to allow claims under the UDHR to proceed on the grounds that there was no private right of action for violation of the UDHR, and the United States was not a signatory to it.\(^{116}\) The court did not address the fact that the United States helped craft the UDHR. In another unreported decision, *Wendt v. Wendt*, the plaintiff in a divorce proceeding cited the UDHR, articles by legal scholars, and laws in sister states in support of her argument that marriage is a partnership. The superior court considered and dismissed her arguments.\(^{117}\)

**Florida**

A number of Florida courts have considered the ICCPR in their decisions, but in only one case has a judge given the covenant any weight. In a 2000 decision, *Booker v. State*,\(^{118}\) the defendant argued that pursuant to the ICCPR and the CAT, the state had forfeited its right to execute him due to the length of time he had spent on death row.\(^{119}\) The Florida Supreme Court rejected the arguments, pointing to a recent decision in which it had found an identical claim “interesting” but without merit. The court dismissed the international law claim on the grounds that “no federal or state courts ha[d] accepted [defendant’s] argument that a prolonged stay on death row constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment, especially where both parties bear responsibility for the long delay.”\(^{120}\) In the 1999

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110. Id. at 616.

111. Id. at 635.

112. Id. at 638.


114. Id. at 267-68.


118. 773 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 2000).

119. Id. at 1096.

120. Id. (quoting *Knight v. State*, 746 So. 2d 423, 437 (Fla. 1998)) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
decision in Brennan v. State, the Florida Supreme Court struck down the Florida juvenile death penalty. A concurring justice invoked the ICCPR in support of an argument based on “evolving standards of decency.” In 2008 a juvenile offender urged the Florida District Court of Appeal to per se ban the use of the sentence of life without parole for juveniles, citing for support the ICCPR and the international community’s aversion to the life sentence for juveniles. The court found the “international pressure to change our existing legal system” the strongest argument for the defendant’s proposition. The court discussed at some length the respectable weight of international opinion and how it may shape the court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. However, the court ultimately declined to create a per se ban on the sentence of life without parole for juveniles, noting that the weight of international opinion must also be balanced against the “due deference owed the state legislatures of this country in matters of sentencing.”

A Florida District Court of Appeal addressed international human rights law outside the criminal penalty context in a 2002 case, Toca v. State. The pro se plaintiff refused to sign court papers on religious grounds, invoking the ICCPR in support of his argument. After observing that there is “scant case law nationally, and none . . . in Florida” that interprets the treaty’s article concerned with religious freedom, the court found the ICCPR inapplicable due to the U.S. Senate’s reservation declaring it non-self-executing. The court also noted that at least one court had interpreted article 18 of the ICCPR, the religious freedom provision, as “furnishing no greater rights or protections than those provided in the First Amendment.” As a result, the court concluded that, even if the ICCPR were enforceable, the plaintiff’s assertions under the ICCPR would fail on their merits, just as his constitutional claims had failed.

Hawaii

In 2007, the Hawaii Supreme Court cited the international Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons, which protects victims of human trafficking and addresses coercive practices relating to prostitution. The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, used the convention to uphold a criminal prostitution statute against privacy challenges by a defendant who was solicited for sexual acts by an undercover police officer. The court’s opinion rested on the societal view that prostitution is “immoral and degrading,” and supported the rationality of the state legislature in criminalizing prostitution with a reference to the convention. The opinion said: “There is a general

120. 754 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999).
121. Id. at 14 n.18 (Anstead, J., concurring). That same year the Florida Supreme Court reversed a death penalty conviction for failure to hold a timely competency hearing in violation of the due process clause and a Florida rule of civil procedure, relying in part on a dissenting opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer invoking foreign decisions on delay in carrying out the death penalty, including a European Court of Human Rights decision. Jones v. State, 740 So. 2d 520, 524-25 (Fla. 1999) (citing Elledge v. Florida, 119 S. Ct. 366 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at *6, *7.
125. Id. at *7.
126. Id.
127. 834 So. 2d 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
128. Id. at 211.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. State v. Romano, 114 Hawai‘i 1, 13 n.14 (Haw. 2007).
132. Id. at 13.
133. Id.
consensus in the international community that prostitution has negative consequences." Thus the defendant’s prostitution conviction was upheld.

**Illinois**

The Illinois Supreme Court has addressed international human rights law in its death penalty decisions. In *People v. Caballero* the court rejected the argument by the government of Mexico, appearing as an amicus, that the death penalty imposed on an 18-year-old Mexican national violated the CERD and the ICCPR. In response to the CERD argument—that the defendant, one of four perpetrators and the only noncitizen, was the only one given the death penalty—the court discussed the substance of the CERD as if it were a binding source of law, but held that the defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. In response to the ICCPR argument—that the defendant was unfairly sentenced to death while a co-perpetrator was given a much lighter sentence—the court invoked the U.S. Senate’s reservation to the ICCPR, asserting that the ICCPR must be read consistently with the U.S. Constitution. Because the imposition of the death penalty was constitutional, the court found that the ICCPR offered no relief.

The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in *People v. Madej* is notable for its discussion of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the context of a death penalty case. The defendant, a Polish citizen, contended that his sentence was void under international law due to the state’s failure to inform him of his right to contact the Polish consulate to assist him with his defense. The court held that the international legal principle of *restitutio in integrum*, an equitable remedy recognized in international law that provides for the restoration of an injured party to his condition *ex ante*, did not invalidate a death sentence. Moreover, the court opined, the defendant’s rights were a matter of public record, and therefore the state did not fraudulently conceal his right to contact a consular official. The decision provoked strong dissents, including one from a justice who cited a decision from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that held that the execution of an individual deprived of his rights under the Vienna Convention violated the “right not to be deprived of life ‘arbitrarily’” under the American Declaration and the ICCPR.

In 2000 Chief Justice Harrison of the Illinois Supreme Court dissented from the majority opinion in *People v. Simms* and cited the courts of the British Commonwealth and the European Convention to support his finding that holding a defendant on death row for fifteen years was “torture . . . inhumane or degrading treatment.” In part because the court viewed the American judicial system as favoring the hearing of all meritorious death sentence appeals, the majority had rejected the inmate’s contention that his multiple death resentencing hearings were unconstitutional.

134. *Id.* at 13 n.14.
135. *Id.* at 1.
136. 206 Ill. 2d 65 (Ill. 2002).
137. *Id.* at 99-102.
138. *Id.* at 103.
139. 193 Ill. 2d 395 (Ill. 2000).
140. *Id.* at 398.
141. *Id.* at 400-01.
142. *Id.* at 402-03.
143. *Id.* at 407-08 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
144. 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1143 (Ill. 2000).
145. *Id.* at 1140-1.
**Indiana**

Only one Indiana court appears to have addressed international human rights. In *Baird v. State* the petitioner sought a subsequent challenge to his death penalty conviction on the grounds that he should not have been sentenced to death because he was mentally ill when he committed the murders. The petitioner argued that international treaties and customary international law prohibited death sentences for the mentally ill, and he was therefore entitled to postconviction relief. The court concluded that the petitioner had not shown a reasonable possibility of success as required for a successive postconviction claim, noting that three of the documents cited by the petitioner—the ICCPR, UDHR, and CAT—did not specifically discuss the execution of mentally ill people. The court further noted that incarcerated individuals like the petitioner lack standing to claim relief under these documents, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004), which held that the UDHR did not impose obligations as a matter of international law and that, given the U.S. reservations, the ICCPR did not create obligations enforceable in American courts.

**Iowa**

The Iowa Supreme Court has addressed international human rights once, in reviewing an appeal of a criminal conviction. To determine whether the defendant was properly convicted of first-degree kidnapping, the court in *State v. White* sought to determine whether torture could encompass mental as well as physical anguish. The court looked to various definitions of torture in dictionaries, treaties, and case law from other jurisdictions, including a federal court case in Georgia that cited the definition of torture in the CAT. The court relied on the definition of torture in that case and others, and affirmed the defendant’s conviction on the grounds that mental anguish alone was sufficient to constitute torture for first-degree kidnapping.

**Kansas**

Kansas courts have addressed international human rights law in the context of both criminal and family law. In *Kansas v. Kleypas* the state’s Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claim that customary international law and unspecified treaties invalidated the Kansas death penalty statute. The court rejected the argument in conclusory fashion, reasoning: “The weight of federal and state authority dictates that no customary international law or international treaty prohibits the State of Kansas from invoking the death penalty as a punishment for certain crimes.” In *In re D.A.* the Kansas Court of Appeals examined the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child as part of its refusal to restore custody of a child to a Mexican national who had been accused of abuse. The court quoted the declaration as evidence of customary international law, but then held that it was consistent with Kansas law and thus did not require any further examination.

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146. *Smith v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr.*, is one recent case where a defendant claimed his jail conditions violated the UDHR. The court, however, declined to address the issue and deemed the suit as frivolous and based on “misguided legal theories regarding Indiana’s jurisdiction to apply International human rights law.” 881 N.E.2d 1100, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
147. 831 N.E.2d 109 (Ind. 2005).
148. Id. at 115.
149. 668 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 2003).
150. Id. at 856-88.
151. Id.
153. Id.
155. Id. at *9.
**Kentucky**

Kentucky courts have also addressed international human rights law in both the criminal and family law contexts. In 2006 the Kentucky Supreme Court considered the ICCPR in reviewing a death sentence, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the ICCPR was a properly ratified treaty and therefore part of the supreme law of the land. The court pointed to a Sixth Circuit decision that noted that the ICCPR was not binding on U.S. courts and did not require the United States to abolish the death penalty. The court noted that the United States had to abide by the covenant only “to the extent that the 5th, 8th, and 14th amendment ban cruel and unusual punishment.” The court found that the defendant had received a fundamentally fair trial and was not deprived of any legal right. More recently, in 2007, the Kentucky Supreme Court reasserted that the ICCPR was ratified by Congress with the specific reservation that articles 1 through 27 are not self-executing, thus leaving the death penalty defendant without a cause of action under the ICCPR. In 1999 a Kentucky Court of Appeals applied the ICCPR by way of the Hague Child Abduction Convention in a case involving a Greek father’s efforts to retrieve his daughter from her mother. The mother defended her actions by arguing, inter alia, that Greek police had subjected her daughter to physical and verbal abuse in violation of the ICCPR. The court did not analyze the applicability of the covenant, holding that the mother had failed to allege anything other than vague, insufficient indictments of the Greek police system.

**Louisiana**

At least one Louisiana court has considered international human rights law in its decision making. In *State v. Craig* the state’s Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision to change the sentence of a juvenile defendant under the age of 18 from a death sentence to life without parole. The defendant challenged the trial court’s decision, arguing that a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence violated the ICCPR and the supremacy clause. The court rejected the defendant’s argument, noting that although the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the ICCPR in *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), it was in the context of rejecting the death penalty for juvenile offenders, not life imprisonment for juvenile offenders. The Louisiana court emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court in *Roper* had in fact affirmed the defendant’s life without benefits sentence. The court added that when the United States ratified the ICCPR, it reserved the right “to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws . . . including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”

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159. Id. at 851.

160. Id.

161. In a recent Louisiana Supreme Court case, the court determined that a death sentence for the rape of a child is not unconstitutional, but in so doing discussed the appropriateness of judges in using international opinion as instructive in their own interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. This sentiment was repeated in the U.S. Supreme Court decision, *State v. Kennedy*, 957 So.2d 757, 784 n.30 (Ky. 2007) (citing *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. at 575), reversed, *Kennedy v. Louisiana*, No. 07-343, 2008 WL 2511282 (U.S. Jun. 25, 2008).


163. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Maine

The Supreme Court of Maine has not yet fully considered international human rights law. However, in 2000 the court did refer to international law in a case involving charges of criminal assault of a son by his father. The court had to draw a line between actions deemed as criminal assault and the fundamental right of parents to control the upbringing of their children, including the use of reasonable force to control their behavior. The court looked to European common law to support its finding of the parental right to use such force to control behavior. It noted that the European Court of Human Rights had ruled that the standards of English common law contravened the European Convention, which applies to the United Kingdom and is viewed as “effectively prohibiting approval of parental corporal punishment.”

Maryland

The Maryland Supreme Court has considered international human rights law in various situations. In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst. the court relied extensively on the Nuremberg Code in its decision that ruled that in certain circumstances of nontherapeutic research programs, informed consent can create a special relationship giving rise to greater duties, a breach of which are actionable in court. In Grimes a lead research program was conducted by an affiliate of the Johns Hopkins University. The project sought to follow the effects of lead poisoning in children by limiting the amount of lead paint that was removed from residential premises. The Johns Hopkins Institutional Review Board approved the project; it allowed for the accumulation of lead in the blood of children, which was previously recognized by the same researchers as highly hazardous, and considered the informed consent of parents as sufficient. The court noted that the subjects were primarily from the lower class, and that landlords were encouraged, and at least in one case required, to have families with young children as their tenants. In the court’s view: “[P]arents, whether improperly enticed by trinkets, food stamps, money or other items, have no more right to intentionally and unnecessarily place children in potentially hazardous non-therapeutic research surroundings, than do researchers. In such cases, parental consent, no matter how informed, is insufficient.” The court relied heavily on the Nuremberg Code in its decision that researchers conducting nontherapeutic research have a special relationship with their subjects that requires greater ethical duties. It noted that: “The Nuremberg Code specifically requires researchers to make known to human subjects of research ‘all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected, and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.’ The court concluded that the interest of the particular child subjected to the research overrides the interests of the parents, researchers, and public at large.

164. State v. Wilder, 748 A.2d 444 (Me. 2000).
165. Id. at 450.
166. Id. at 449 n.6.
167. Id.
168. 366 Md. 29, 113 (Md. 2001).
169. Id. at 37-8.
170. Id. at 41.
171. Id. at 74 (“The Nuremberg Code is the ‘most complete and authoritative statement of the law of informed consent to human experimentation.’ It is also ‘part of international common law and may be applied, in both civil and criminal cases, by state, federal and municipal courts in the United States.’”).
172. Id. at 105.
In a sexual identity case, where the petitioner was transitioning from male to female and wanted the gender changed on all of her documents to reflect her identity accordingly, the Maryland Supreme Court looked favorably toward international human rights law. The court ruled that lower courts have jurisdiction to consider the recognition of gender changes based on the evidence available to them, and that an outright ban on gender modification, as a matter of law, was improper. In so doing, the court cited the European Convention and a decision from the European Court of Human Rights concluding that the “deep personal, social, and economic interest in having the official designation of his or her gender match what, in fact, it always was or possibly has become” is indeed a right. The Maryland Supreme Court has also considered international human rights law in the death penalty context. In a 1984 decision the court refused to invalidate the state’s juvenile death penalty statute on constitutional grounds. Although the court noted that the ICCPR and the American Convention “have called for the abolition of capital punishment of juveniles,” it contrasted their provisions with the practices of states and decided that it was “unable to conclude that society’s contemporary standards of decency have rejected capital punishment of juveniles.”

**Massachusetts**

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in *Adoption of Peggy* held that the CRC did not prohibit the termination of a father’s parental rights and the adoption of his child without his consent. Although the court held that the convention did not apply to Massachusetts courts because the United States had not ratified it, the court nonetheless applied the CRC and held that the proceedings complied with the CRC’s provisions.

**Michigan**

Two dissenting justices of the Michigan Supreme Court have relied on international human rights law to support their positions. In *State v. Davis*, a 2005 decision, a dissenting justice disagreed with the majority’s decision that a prior conviction in Kentucky for a single offense did not bar a second prosecution in Michigan. The justice took issue with the majority’s reliance on what she deemed outdated U.S. Supreme Court case law on the double jeopardy clause and invoked the ICCPR in support of her argument. In an earlier case a dissenting justice disagreed with the majority’s decision upholding a Michigan statute that required two religious schools to close for failure to comply with a teacher certification requirement. To support her interpretation of the First Amendment’s establishment clause, the

174. *Id.* at 723.
175. *Id.* at 710.
176. *Id.* at 710 n.7.
178. *Id.* at 423.
180. *Id.* at 699-700.
182. *Id.* (observing that “international law recognizes that multiple prosecutions by separate nations violate fundamental human rights” and citing the ICCPR).
justice cited the UDHR for the proposition that “parents should have the prior right, and primary role, in directing the education of their children.”

Mississippi

Only after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), have Mississippi courts given any weight to international human rights law. In a 2003 habeas petition, McGilberry v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s arguments under the ICCPR, invoking U.S. Senate reservations and noting that the treaty did not bar the state from executing a juvenile offender. After the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Roper, however, the Mississippi Supreme Court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions that it resentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without parole.

In a 2004 opinion in Dycus v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the ICCPR barred the juvenile death penalty. The court indicated no willingness to consider international law: “[T]his is an appeal concerning a crime committed in the State of Mississippi and heard by a Mississippi state court... [The defendant] has cited no applicable laws in the United States nor in Mississippi where international law has been applied to a death penalty case in a state court. The issue is without merit.”

The U.S. Supreme Court overturned and remanded Dycus on appeal in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper. The Mississippi Supreme Court called for supplemental briefs from the parties, and both sides agreed that Dycus should be resentenced to life in prison without parole. Justice Michael Randolph made clear that he concurred only because his “oath and loyalty to th[e] office and the law require[d] [him] to comply with the mandate of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roper.” His concurrence was joined by five other justices. Justice Randolph drew upon Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s criticism of the majority opinion in Roper as “legally flawed, lack[ing] valid reasoning and def[ying] historic precedent,” and he emphasized: “If personal whims or beliefs are besetting the Constitution, and ignoring the rule of law, then those culpable of such conduct should either recuse themselves from such cases, or consider the honorable path chosen by former Justice Harry A. Blackmun... [who] when faced with such a dilemma declared, ‘I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.’” Justice Randolph “respectfully urge[d] the Supreme Court to exercise judicial restraint, as the function of all courts is to adjudicate, not to legislate.” He added: “Courts are charged with the responsibility to interpret, not create law.”

In a 2005 case, Jordan v. State, the petitioner sought postconviction relief, alleging that his attorneys were ineffective because they failed to raise various international treaties as defenses to imposition of the death penalty. The petitioner cited the ICCPR, CAT, CERD, American Convention, and ICESCR, claiming that those treaties should be enforced under the supremacy clause. The court “unhesitatingly acknowledged” the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, but noted

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184. Id. at 537 n.30.
185. McGilberry v. Mississippi, 843 So. 2d 21, 32 (Miss. 2003).
187. 875 So. 2d 140, 168-69 (Miss. 2004).
188. Id. at 168-69.
191. Id. at 1102 (Randolph, J., specially concurring).
192. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
193. 918 So. 2d 636, 656 (Miss. 2005).
194. Id.
that the petitioner was 18 years of age—“and only 81 days from his 19th birthday”—and it therefore chose to “decline to rely on international law, covenants and treaties in determining whether the death penalty is appropriate.”  

**Missouri**

The Missouri Supreme Court in *Simmons v. Roper* found that juvenile executions were prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  

The court found it “of note,” “although by no means dispositive,” “that the views of the international community have consistently grown in opposition to the death penalty for juveniles.” The court referred to the CRC and to “other international treaties and agreements” that “expressly prohibit the practice.”

**Montana**

In 2004 the Montana Supreme Court ruled that Montana University’s denial of health coverage to same-sex partners of employees was a policy not rationally related to a legitimate government interest, including marriage, and violated equal protection. In a special concurrence Judge Nelson drew upon the Montana constitution’s human dignity clause, which, he noted, “reflects the international community’s focus on human dignity as a fundamental value.” The clause found its origins in the Puerto Rican constitution, which “followed from a history of international and foreign constitution-making and human rights declarations at the end of World War II” and ultimately came from international concepts of human dignity.

**Nevada**

As with most states’ courts, the Nevada Supreme Court has addressed international human rights law in the context of its death penalty jurisprudence. Although the court as a whole has at times displayed little patience with international law, at least one justice, Robert Rose, has proven willing to consider human rights claims.

In *Servin v. State* the Nevada Supreme Court relied on the U.S. Senate’s reservation to the ICCPR to hold that the treaty does not prohibit American jurisdictions from executing juveniles, although it found other reasons to invalidate the sentence as applied to the defendant. In his concurring opinion Justice Rose argued that customary international law prohibits the execution of minors and thus provided a second basis for the majority’s decision. He considered and rejected the argument that the Senate’s reservation to the ICCPR is invalid, but then examined the work of international

195. *Id.*
197. *Id.* at 411.
198. *Id.*
200. *Id.* at 168.
201. *Id.*
202. E.g., *Colwell v. Nevada*, 118 Nev. 807, 815 (Nev. 2002) (holding that the argument that death by lethal injection violates the ICCPR is procedurally barred).
203. 117 Nev. 775 (Nev. 2001).
204. *Id.* at 787.
205. *Id.* at 794 (Rose, J., concurring).
206. *Id.*
law scholars to support his conclusion that customary international law required that the defendant’s sentence be commuted.\textsuperscript{207}

Similarly, in \textit{Domingues v. State}\textsuperscript{208} a majority of the Nevada Supreme Court relied on the reservation to the ICCPR to reject the defendant’s argument that the treaty bars the execution of minors.\textsuperscript{209} Justice Rose dissented, arguing that the case should be remanded to allow the district court to determine whether the Senate’s reservation is valid and, if not, whether the treaty would continue to bind the United States.\textsuperscript{210} Chief Justice Charles Springer also dissented, arguing that the ICCPR is a binding treaty, and that the United States should not “join . . . hands with such countries as Iran, Iraq, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Pakistan in approving death sentences for children.”\textsuperscript{211}

\textbf{New Hampshire}

The New Hampshire Supreme Court has relied on international human rights law to support its interpretation of parental rights under the state constitution.\textsuperscript{212} In \textit{State v. Robert H.}, a father challenged the termination of his parental rights on grounds of neglect.\textsuperscript{213} After a discussion of the constitutional right of parents to assume the primary role in their children’s upbringing, the court quoted from the ICCPR and the ICESCR in support of its conclusion: “The family and the rights of parents over it are held to be natural, essential, and inherent rights within the meaning of [the] New Hampshire Constitution.”\textsuperscript{214}

\textbf{New Jersey}

New Jersey courts have had little occasion to consider human rights law. In \textit{Sojourner A. v. New Jersey Department of Human Services}, the Supreme Court of New Jersey summarily rejected arguments by amici curiae that the New Jersey statute that established a “family cap” in New Jersey’s welfare program violated international norms related to birth-status discrimination.\textsuperscript{215} In \textit{ACLU v. County of Hudson}, a suit to compel counties that held detainees for the Immigration and Naturalization Service in their jails to disclose information on detainees, the New Jersey Appellate Division found that “questions of whether and the extent to which international law guarantees have been denied to the INS detainees are not before us,” but acknowledged that it must “construe State statutes and such federal laws as may come before [it] agreeably to any treaties to which the United States may be a party, for treaties are the supreme law of the land.”\textsuperscript{216} However, the international law issues had not been developed sufficiently in the trial court to be preserved for appeal.

In a 1998 decision, \textit{State v. Nelson}, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that international law did not require invalidation of New Jersey’s death penalty, given that the United States had not

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{207} Id. at 795-96.
\bibitem{208} 114 Nev. 783 (Nev. 1998).
\bibitem{209} Id. at 785-86.
\bibitem{210} Id. at 786-87 (Rose, J., dissenting).
\bibitem{211} Id. at 786 (Springer, C.J., dissenting).
\bibitem{212} 118 N.H. 713 (N.H. 1978), overruled in part by \textit{In re Craig T.}, 147 N.H. 739 (N.H. 2002).
\bibitem{213} Id. at 714.
\bibitem{214} Id. at 716.
\bibitem{215} 177 N.J. 318, 336 n.9 (N.J. 2003).
\end{thebibliography}
subscribed to any human rights accord that invalidated the death penalty. The Supreme Court of New Jersey echoed that reasoning in *State v. Timmendequas*, finding again that customary international law did not require invalidation of the New Jersey death penalty.

**New York**

New York courts have significant experience addressing international human rights law in both civil and criminal contexts. However, New York courts have not utilized international human rights law since the 1990 opinion in *State v. Scutari* (discussed below). In a 1950 case a New York trial court considered the UDHR in its decision prohibiting a labor union that had exclusive negotiating rights with a tavern from forcing the establishment to fire its female barmaids, who were ineligible to join the union. The court condemned discrimination on the grounds of gender “as a violation of the fundamental principles of American democracy” and noted that provisions of the UDHR were “[i]ndicative of the spirit of our times,” quoting articles 2 and 23, which protect equal rights and the right to work, free choice in employment, favorable work conditions, and protection against unemployment.

In *Jamar Productions Corp. v. Quill*, a 1966 case concerned with the right of workers to strike, a lower court pronounced the provisions of the UDHR “precepts of ethical behavior” and analogized them to “doctrinal codes and commands of religious bodies and orders.” The court noted, however, that these “precepts” did not “yet entail judicial authority” and were “not in the texture of known categories of actions available here, despite the growth of regard and concern for redress of tortious wrongs.”

A 1972 decision by the New York Court of Appeals considered whether “children in embryo are and must be recognized as legal persons or entities entitled under the State and Federal Constitutions to a right to life.” The court found that the state constitution “does not confer or require legal personality for the unborn” and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, remanding the case to the trial court to enter a declaratory judgment “sustaining the validity of the statute” that outlined “[j]ustifiable abortional act[s].”

In his dissenting opinion Judge Adrian Burke argued that “our laws should protect the unborn,” pointing to the UN Convention against Genocide, “which forbids any Nation or State to classify any group of living human beings as fit subjects for annihilation.” He concluded that “the butchering of a foetus [sic] under the present law is inherently wrong, as it is an illegal interference with the life of a human being of nature.”

In a 1979 decision a lower court addressed international human rights law in a discovery dispute. The court considered whether to allow the issuance of letters rogatory to a court in the Soviet Union to

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221. 51 Misc. 2d 501, 509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
222. Id.
224. Id. at 199, 203.
225. Id. at 206-08.
226. Id. at 208.
take the testimony of a party. The court noted that letters rogatory are the least favored method of disclosure and added that denying alleged inheritance distributees in the Soviet Union the right to pursue their inheritance by appearing in New York court violated the Helsinki Accords, an international human rights treaty signed by both countries.

The court quoted extensively from the Helsinki Accords, including the portion that guarantees U.S. and Soviet compliance with international human rights principles: “In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.” The court denied the petitioner’s motion to take testimony by means of letters rogatory.

In 1984 another lower court demonstrated its willingness to accept the UDHR as a source of legal obligation. The court in Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company recited the act of state doctrine, which bars American courts from inquiring into the validity of the public acts of a foreign sovereign on its own soil, but opined in a footnote that the act of state doctrine would not apply “for acts in gross violation of accepted standards of international law.” The court pointed to the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, which drew upon “universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights.” The court in Beck suggested in dicta that violations of the UN Charter and the UDHR may be actionable in American courts.

A few years later, in State v. Scutari, a lower court again considered the applicability of international human rights law. The defendants, accused of criminal trespass, argued that they were justified in remaining in a U.S. Congressman’s office after closure to protest U.S. aid to El Salvador, given its human rights violations. In their defense, the defendants testified, and called witnesses to testify, that the law of the United States incorporates international law, as well as constitutional law and treaties. According to the defendants’ expert in international law and human rights, continued U.S. aid to the government of El Salvador violated the Geneva Accords. The court “acknowledge[d] that international law is part of United States Law.” But the court concluded that the “defendants offered no proof that the Congressman’s vote would have any immediate impact on the continued funding” of the government of El Salvador; therefore, the defendants’ actions did not constitute “an emergency measure that could reasonably have been thought to accomplish the goal of changing United States policy.”

**North Carolina**

The North Carolina courts have expressed little patience with international human rights law in the criminal context. In State v. Smith, a 2002 death penalty case, the North Carolina Supreme Court admitted that “state law must yield when it is inconsistent with or impairs the policy” of treaties, but held, with little reasoning, that the ICCPR did not prohibit the defendant’s execution. The court summarily rejected the defendant’s arguments that the long delay between sentencing and execution

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228. 424 N.Y.S.2d at 824-25 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
230. *Id.* at 774 n.5.
231. *Id.* (citing 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980)).
233. *Id.* at 946.
234. *Id.*
and the conditions of death row inmates constituted “cruel or degrading treatment or punishment” and “arbitrary deprivation of life” in violation of the ICCPR. Subsequent North Carolina Supreme Court decisions reference Smith to dismiss in conclusory fashion international law arguments in death penalty cases.

In State v. Thompson, a 2004 death penalty case, the North Carolina Supreme Court went a step further in explaining its reasoning in dismissing international human rights law arguments. The court refused to address the defendant’s ICCPR argument on the grounds that it did not have the duty to apply international law even if state laws were in conflict. That same year the Court of Appeals rejected an ICCPR-based argument on the grounds that the treaty is non-self-executing. And a year later, in State v. Duke, the North Carolina Supreme Court again rejected a defendant’s argument that the North Carolina capital sentencing statute violated international law. The court noted, without further explanation, that it had rejected this issue, among others, in the past and “decline[d] to depart from . . . prior precedent.”

The defendant in State v. Campbell, a case decided in 2005, attempted to utilize international law as a shield against a death penalty sentence imposed for first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The defendant alleged that the imposition of a death sentence was in violation of the ICCPR, a covenant to which the United States was a party. However, the court summarily disregarded this argument without further discussion, stating that it had “considered [the] defendant’s arguments on these issues and conclude[d that the] defendant ha[d] shown no compelling reason to depart from [its] previous holdings.”

In 2006 the defendant in State v. Hurst argued “that the death penalty constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the . . . International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” However, this argument was also rejected on the grounds of Smith. In State v. Allen, another decision of 2006, the North Carolina Supreme Court again cited Smith to reject the defendant’s argument that the ICCPR prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life. The court determined that, given the U.S. reservation, the ICCPR did not prohibit the defendant’s execution. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the length of time and the conditions under which he expected to be detained while appealing his conviction and sentence violated article VI of the ICCPR. The court noted that article VII condemns torture and reasoned that allowing the defendant to appeal his conviction and sentence was not “torturous.” The court held: “We simply cannot find a violation of defendant’s rights merely because he chooses to subject himself to the rigors of judicial review.”

236. Id.
238. 359 N.C. 77, 126 (N.C. 2004) (“[W]e acknowledge that notions of international justice are not always consistent with our state and nation. We recognize that our foremost task is to uphold the Constitutions of the United States and the State of North Carolina. . . . To that end, we exercise judicial restraint and decline to consider the general principles of international law raised by defendant”).
242. Id. at 705.
243. Id. at 706.
244. 359 N.C. 77, 126 (N.C. 2004).
245. Id. at 206.
247. Id.
The reluctance of North Carolina courts to confront international law has also manifested itself outside the criminal context. In *Gaspersohn v. Harnett County Board of Education* the amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiff urged the Court of Appeals to declare that the UN Charter prohibits corporal punishment. As the following conclusory statement suggests, the court was unwilling to consider international law: “The United States Supreme Court in *Ingraham* did not mention the UN Charter or the application of international law. We do not believe we should hold that international law made applicable to North Carolina by the UN Charter proscribes corporal punishment.”

**North Dakota**

In *Riemers v. Anderson* the North Dakota Supreme Court refused to permit a plaintiff to prosecute a civil claim against law enforcement officials for violations of the ICCPR. The court adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning in *Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation*, explaining that the U.S. Senate’s declaration that the ICCPR is not self-executing means that “this treaty does not create a private cause of action in United States courts.” The North Dakota Supreme Court also stressed the plaintiff’s failure to draw its “attention to any decisions construing or applying the covenant” as a basis for the dismissal.

**Ohio**

In several cases before Ohio courts, defendants have unsuccessfully attempted to invalidate the Ohio death penalty statute as inconsistent with various treaties and customary international law. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in *State v. Phillips* is representative of the reasoning in these cases. In *Phillips* the court observed that the American Declaration does not mention the death penalty, and the U.S. Senate ratified the Charter of the Organization of American States with the reservation that none of its obligations would violate principles of federalism codified in the U.S. Constitution. The Ohio Court of Appeals in *State v. Skatzes* ruled that Ohio’s death penalty statutes, which do not violate due process and which are not imposed in a racially discriminatory manner, are consistent with customary international law.

One defendant pursued a slightly different route; he attempted to question the ability of the Senate to place reservations and conditions at the front end of the process for the adoption of treaties by the United States, thereby arguing that the United States was required to abide by all the provisions of international treaties. In *State v. Tenace*, an unreported decision, the defendant attempted to convince

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248. 75 N.C. App. 23, 35 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985). The U.S. Supreme Court in *Ingraham* held that the Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishment, does not apply to corporal punishment in schools.

249. 680 N.W.2d 280, 286 (N.D. 2004).

250. 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003).

251. 680 N.W.2d at 286 (quoting *Flores*, 343 F.3d at 164 n.35).

252. Id. at 287; see also *Riemers v. O’Halloran*, 678 N.W.2d 347, 550 (N.D. 2004) (holding that the plaintiff had failed to provide “any supportive reasoning or citations to relevant authorities showing that the [ICCP] was either violated or applicable” to his argument that prosecution witnesses were not immune from suit).


the court that obligations under international covenants and treaties are not limited by the reservations and conditions that the United States placed on them.256 The defendant went on to argue that the Senate did not have the power to adopt a treaty with reservations and that its declaration that the ICCPR is not self-executing was unconstitutional.257 The court in Tenace, however, again utilized the reasoning that “none of the treaties cited by appellant ban[ned] the death penalty... Therefore, the issue of whether the [sic] could be adopted with reservations or [were] self-executing [was] irrelevant.”258 Additionally, the issue of international customary law was raised in Tenace when the appellant argued that the state’s death penalty statute violated the guarantees of equal protection, due process, right to life, and protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. These arguments also failed, with the court citing both the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Buell (which stated, “there is no customary international law prohibiting the death penalty for adult offenders”)259 and the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Issa, where the court held that “the Ohio death penalty statute [did] not violate the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.”260

In State v. Conway Conway brought a petition for postconviction relief, challenging his death sentence.261 Conway argued that the trial court erred in failing to appoint and fund an expert witness on international law to demonstrate that his convictions and sentence violated customary international law guaranteed by the UDHR, ICCPR, and American Declaration. The Court of Appeals rejected Conway’s arguments, noting that the state statute granting postconviction relief only provided for appointment of counsel, not a right to expert witnesses.262 Other attempts have been made on appeal to try to bring international law arguments into discussions seeking postconviction relief. However, courts have refused to consider new international law arguments, because the courts determined that these arguments could and should have been brought up during the trial or on direct appeal. As a result, the courts decided (in a series of unreported cases) that these arguments were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and did not consider them in their deliberations.263

International human rights arguments had more success in one civil case. An Ohio Court of Common Pleas relied on the CRC in In re Julie Anne to prohibit a child’s mother from smoking tobacco in her presence.264 The court noted that the convention was “the most universally accepted human rights document in the history of the world,” and “create[d] obligations for signatory governments to ensure children’s right to the highest attainable standard of health.”265 The court also emphasized “that under the CRC, which has been ratified by the United States, courts of law, and state legislatures, administrative agencies have a duty as a matter of human rights to reduce children’s compelled exposure to tobacco smoke.”266 The court’s reasoning may be flawed, however, as the United States has not in fact ratified the CRC but merely its optional protocols.

257. Id.
258. Id.
260. Id. citing State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 69, 752 N.E.2d 904 (Ohio 2001).
262. Id. at *P15.
264. 121 Ohio Misc. 2d 20 (2002). But see Rodgers v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation & Correction, 91 Ohio App. 3d 565 (1993) (rejecting without discussion a pro se prisoner litigant’s claims against the Ohio corrections department for alleged violations of the ICCPR, UDHR, and Helsinki Final Act).
265. 121 Ohio Misc. 2d at 41.
266. 121 Ohio Misc. 2d at 47.
Oklahoma

Only one Oklahoma court has addressed international human rights law. In Valdez v. State, a Mexican national, submitted a subsequent application for postconviction relief on the grounds that he was not notified of his rights under article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which provides foreign nationals detained in the United States a right to consular notification and assistance. Valdez cited the International Court of Justice’s decision in F. R. G. v. United States, which found that the United States, through the state of Arizona, had violated the Vienna Convention when it failed to notify two German nationals convicted of a crime of their rights under article 36.

Valdez argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals should grant him relief on the basis of F. R. G. v. United States, and noted that the United States is bound by international treaties, had signed the UN Charter, and ratified the optional protocol to the Vienna Convention, requiring compliance with the decisions of the International Court of Justice. In its amicus brief the government of Mexico echoed Valdez’s arguments, claiming that courts in the United States cannot provide a remedy to German nationals that is not equally applicable to non-Germans without violating U.S. obligations under the CERD. Oklahoma countered these arguments, noting that the U.S. Constitution’s supremacy clause “does not convert violations of treaty provisions into violations of constitutional rights.” The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Valdez’s international law arguments on the grounds that these claims were available to him from the time of his arrest and could have been raised in his first post-conviction application.

Oregon

The Oregon Supreme Court has drawn upon international human rights law in deciding a number of cases. In a 1949 decision, Namba v. McCourt, the Supreme Court of Oregon referred to article 55 of the UN Charter to support its declaration that the Oregon Alien Land Law violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Oregon Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Sterling v. Cupp is often cited as an example of how a state court can use international human rights law to provide interpretive guidance for state constitutional protections. In Sterling the plaintiffs, male inmates of the Oregon State Penitentiary, sued to enjoin prison officials from assigning female guards to duties that involved frisking male prisoners and supervising them in showers. The prisoners invoked a number of state and federal constitutional provisions in support of their claims, including article I, section 13 of the Oregon constitution, which prohibits the treatment of prisoners with “unnecessary rigor.” To determine the meaning of “unnecessary rigor,” the court examined a variety of sources, including international legal standards for the treatment of detainees in the UDHR, ICCPR, and European Convention.
The court carefully explained: “The various formulations in these different sources in themselves are not constitutional law” but rather “contemporary expressions of the same concern with minimizing needlessly harsh, degrading, or dehumanizing treatment of prisoners that is expressed in article I, section 13.”

In *Humphers v. First Interstate Bank* the Supreme Court of Oregon considered whether the plaintiff had stated a claim for damages in alleging that her former physician revealed her identity to a daughter she had given up for adoption. The plaintiff argued, among other things, that her former doctor’s disclosure of confidential information was an invasion of privacy and a breach of his contractual obligation to keep her identity secret. In considering the definition of privacy, the court looked, inter alia, to various law review articles, including an article that referred to the right to privacy in international human rights documents, and quoted the relevant provisions of the UDHR and the European Convention.

**Pennsylvania**

Pennsylvania trial courts have considered human rights law in considering the right to education and the death penalty. In *Commonwealth v. Sadler*, a trial court reviewed the conviction of a 15-year-old youth to determine, among other things, whether the state had violated the Pennsylvania constitution by failing to provide the defendant schooling while in custody because he was certified to be tried in adult court. The court noted that the right to education is established under the UDHR and is fundamental to American democracy. It found that a “boy in custody, regardless of his status under the criminal law, is still a child and entitled to the education rights of all children.” The judge determined that the separate classification of youths certified to be tried in adult court was a violation of the equal protection clause and Pennsylvania statutes.

In *Pennsylvania v. Sattazahn* the petitioner sought postconviction relief for his death sentence, arguing that the court’s failure to instruct the jury that its life-sentencing option was statutorily defined as life without possibility of parole violated U.S. constitutional law, as well as “United States international human rights treaty obligations against arbitrary deprivation of life and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” The court dismissed the claim, finding that the petitioner failed to raise it on direct appeal and therefore waived it.

The death penalty issue was explored further in *Commonwealth v. Judge*. Convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree and one count of possession of an instrument of a crime, the appellant was sentenced to death. The appellant escaped from custody to Canada, but was subsequently deported to New York and extradited to Pennsylvania. He then filed a complaint with the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), claiming that deportation to face a death sentence violated his rights under the ICCPR. The United States responded, declining to recognize the weight of the ICCPR and declaring it to be non-self-executing. However, the UNHRC declared that the appellant’s right to life had been “violated by his deportation without receipt of assurances that his death sentence would not be carried out.” As a result, the appellant filed a petition to reduce his

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277. *Id.* at 622.
278. 298 Ore. 706 (Or. 1984).
279. *Id.* at 715 n.7.
281. *Id.* at 330-31.
282. *Id.*
285. *Id.* at 135.
sentence to life imprisonment or removal to Canada286 and argued that the United States, as a party to the ICCPR, was required to enforce the provisions of the treaty as binding federal law.287 He further argued that the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution required international treaties to be treated as equivalent to federal law.288 Though the appellant’s arguments were extensive, the court held that, “although [the] Appellant was entitled to raise his claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, neither the decisions of the Committee nor the ICCPR itself mandate that this Court provide a remedy for Canada’s violations.” The court went on to say that it could not “enforce as laws those treaties, no matter how admirable their purposes, which Congress has not chosen to incorporate into our domestic legal system.”289

**Tennessee**

Tennessee courts have grappled with international human rights law in the context of criminal appeals, usually in death penalty cases. In *State v. Odom*290 the defendant in a capital case invoked the ICCPR, CERD, and CAT to argue that “(1) customary international law and specific international treaties prohibit capital punishment; and (2) customary international law and specific international treaties prohibit reinstatement of the death penalty once it has been abolished.”291 The Supreme Court of Tennessee began its analysis with the observation that “the defendant has cited no decision of any court accepting his arguments.” It then signaled its willingness to follow federal pronouncements on international law by adopting the logic of the Sixth Circuit in *Buell v. Mitchell*,292 where the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that the American Declaration and the ICCPR invalidated death penalty statutes in the United States.293 The *Odom* court stressed in particular that international human rights treaties were not self-executing, that Senate reservations to these treaties were valid, and that the treaties did not stand for a customary international legal prohibition on the death penalty.294

In *State v. Faulkner* the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals ruled nearly identically, disavowing any competence even to pronounce on the content of customary international law and citing with approval the following passage from *Buell*: “We hold that determination of whether customary international law prevents a State from carrying out the death penalty, when the State otherwise is acting in full compliance with the Constitution, is a question that is reserved to the executive and legislative branches of the United States government, as it is their constitutional role to determine the extent of this country’s international obligations and how best to carry them out.”295

In another case the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to stay an execution to allow an allegedly mentally ill defendant to pursue relief in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.296 The court declared, “As a general rule, international agreements, even those benefiting private parties, do not create rights privately enforceable in domestic courts,” and that only agreements “where such rights are contemplated in the” text itself do so.297 It then denied that the American Declaration and the

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286. Id. at 136-7.
287. Id. at 143.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 152.
290. 137 S.W.3d 572 (Tenn. 2004).
291. Id. at 597.
292. 274 F. 3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001).
293. Odom, 137 S.W.3d at 598-99.
294. Id. at 599-600.
297. Id. at 174.
American Convention create judicially cognizable private rights. The court further observed that any decision by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, even if pursuant to a binding treaty, would constitute merely a “recommendation” and thus would not bind Tennessee courts.

The Court of Criminal Appeals displayed more willingness to address the merits of an international human rights claim in its discussion of a defendant’s double jeopardy defense based on the ICCPR in State v. Carpenter. The court found that the plaintiff, who challenged a successive prosecution in Tennessee after a conviction in Ohio, “correctly point[ed] out that a properly ratified treaty is the supreme law of the land.” But the court held that the ICCPR does not prohibit prosecutions by different sovereigns, and “in ratifying the ICCPR . . . [t]he Senate wished to preserve the ability for the federal government and states to successively prosecute a person under the ‘dual sovereignties’ exception to the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy bar.” The court noted that the Senate’s reservations invalidate any argument that international law does not recognize states in a federal system as different sovereigns.

In a final case the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals refused to find that the defendant had been denied effective assistance of counsel for his counsel’s failure to raise purported violations of the UDHR, CAT, ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD, CEDAW, American Convention, and American Declaration.

Texas

Texas courts have addressed international human rights law in a variety of contexts. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Hinojosa v. Texas refused to set aside a defendant’s death sentence pursuant to the UN Charter. The court held that, generally speaking, “individuals do not have standing to bring suit based on an international treaty when sovereign nations are not involved in the dispute.” After an analysis of the charter’s “meaning and purpose,” the court stated that the document did not “establish individually enforceable rights.” Moreover, the court held that the charter does not mandate the abolition of the death penalty. In a recent case the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected a defendant’s argument that his death sentence violated the CAT, ICCPR, and supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. It reasoned that the U.S. Senate filed reservations to both treaties that state that they do not prohibit the United States from imposing capital punishment consistent with the Constitution.

298. Id. at 175.
299. Id.
301. Id. at 578.
302. Id. at 579 n.4.
303. Id. at 578-79. The court took care to explain that the federal government could not enter into an agreement that inhibited states’ ability to punish intrastate violence without overstepping Tenth Amendment bounds. Id. at 579 n.4. See also State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 391-93 (Tenn. 2005) (reaffirming its decision in Carpenter and dismissing defendant’s claim that his state court trial violated the ICCPR, because defendant’s federal charges arose from the same criminal event).
306. Id. at 252.
307. Id.
308. Id.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in *Ex parte Medellin* also dealt with the death penalty issue. In *Medellin* a Mexican national was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The defendant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his rights had been violated because he had not been told that he could contact a Mexican consular official after he was arrested. The defendant also claimed that decisions of the International Court of Justice were binding federal law that preempted the law of the State of Texas. The court disagreed. After extensive examination of the procedural history and various claims brought by the defendant, the court determined that “the ICJ Avena decision and the Presidential memorandum [did] not constitute binding federal law that preempt[ed] . . . the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and that neither qualifi[ed] as a previously unavailable factual or legal basis.” It subsequently dismissed the defendant’s application for a writ of habeas corpus.

In an unpublished opinion in *Townsend v. Texas*, the defendant appealed his conviction for the misdemeanor offense of harassment for repeatedly calling a woman after she asked him to stop and after the police department sent him a letter requesting that he stop. He argued that the statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutionally vague and overly broad, violated U.S. treaty obligations, and violated *jus cogens* international law under the ICCPR. The defendant also contended that the federal, state, and county governments violated his rights under the ICCPR and CAT by, inter alia, stealing his inheritance, bringing false charges, placing him under surveillance and in solitary confinement, torturing him while in jail, attempting to assassinate him, and “acting in reference to the Appellant as totalitarian states generally act.” The Court of Appeals declined to address these arguments, reasoning that “appellant’s complaints [did] not attack the validity of the judgment” and were “inappropriate on appeal.” The court rejected the defendant’s claims relating to *jus cogens* international law pursuant to the ICCPR, because he presented no arguments on the issue.

In *Dubai Petroleum Company v. Kazi* the family of an Indian citizen killed while working on an oil rig off the coast of the United Arab Emirates brought a wrongful death suit. Under Texas law, suits for wrongful death are permissible if the decedent’s country of citizenship has “equal treaty rights” with the United States. To determine whether India has equal rights with the United States, the Texas Supreme Court looked to the provisions of the ICCPR, on which the plaintiffs relied. The court interpreted article 14(1) of the ICCPR as “requi[ring] all signatory countries to confer the right of equality before the courts to citizens of all other signatories.” The court quoted from a comment by the UNHRC, explaining that the ICCPR “not only guarantees foreign citizens equal treatment in the signatories’ courts, but also guarantees them equal access to these courts.” The court cited the UNHRC’s comment in rejecting the defendant’s contention that article 14(1) does not confer “equal treaty rights.”

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311. *Id.* at 315.
312. *Id.* at 352.
314. *Id.* at *10-11.
315. *Id.* at *7-8,* *12.
316. 12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2000); see also *Ford Motor Co. v. Aguigina*, 9 S.W.3d 252, 261-62 (Tex. App. 1999) (discussing the ICCPR in the context of equal treaty rights in a negligence suit where subject matter jurisdiction was at issue).
317. *Id.* at 82.
318. *Id.*
319. *Id.*
Utah

The Utah Supreme Court used the ICCPR to help define constitutional standards for treatment of prisoners in *Bott v. DeLand*. The plaintiff, a prisoner, suffered severe health problems after prison physicians failed to diagnose him correctly. He argued that physicians had subjected him to “unnecessary rigor” in violation of the Utah constitution. The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s limitation on the damages he recovered. In upholding the damages limitation, the court drew on the UDHR and the ICCPR to determine what constituted abusive conditions in prisons and to decide whether the treatment the plaintiff had endured qualified as such under the constitution’s “unnecessary rigor” provision.

Washington

Washington courts have interpreted and applied human rights treaties in several decisions involving its penal statutes. In an unpublished opinion, *Washington v. Berry*, the defendant argued that a life sentence without parole violated his right under the ICCPR to a prison term with rehabilitation, not punishment, as its goal. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument, stressing that the ICCPR “speaks of the goal of penitentiary systems in general and not what can or cannot be done with individual prisoners.” It invoked the U.S. Senate’s reservation to that provision of the ICCPR, which insists that the provision “does not diminish the goals of punishment, deterrence and incapacitation as additional legitimate purposes.” The Court of Appeals also rebuffed a defendant’s efforts to use the ICCPR to procure a lighter sentence in *In re Haynes*. The petitioner argued that the state imposed a heavier penalty on him than the penalty available at the time of the crime’s commission, in violation of the covenant. The court disagreed about the facts, but also noted in *dicta* the possibility that the ICCPR is not self-executing “and therefore does not apply to the states.”

In a 1973 civil case the Washington Supreme Court relied in part on the freedom of movement guarantee in the UDHR to support its holding that the Washington constitution prohibited Seattle’s one-year residency requirement for those applying for civil-service positions. The court mentioned the UDHR in a background discussion of the freedom of movement in Anglo-American law.

Finally, in two cases the court refused to apply the tenets of international treaties because the treaties themselves were not self-executing. The first opinion, *In re Hegney*, involved a situation where the defendant sought relief from a sentence of first-degree felony murder. The court, however, refused to apply any related international treaties. Although the defendant argued that the ICCPR should be controlling in this case, the court disagreed. It stated that “treaties such as the ICCPR [do] not automatically supersede local laws that are inconsistent with it unless the treaty provisions are

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321. 922 P.2d at 735.
322. 922 P.2d at 740.
327. 81 Wash. 2d 840, 841 (Wash. 1973).
328. 81 Wash. 2d 840, 841 (Wash. 1973).
self-executing. “State v. Hankins,” decided one month later, followed this familiar line of reasoning. The court wrote in the decision: “International treaties are only binding on the states when they have been signed and ratified by the United States, and when they are either self-executing or have been executed through implementing legislation.” It went on to state that the CRC had not been ratified by the United States, the CRC was thus not binding on the court, and “the ICCPR [did] not create a private right of action.” Concluding its opinion, the court in Hankins also analyzed the question of customary law, stating that “customary international law does not apply to a direct challenge of a statute . . . because the law-making function has been entrusted to the legislative branches of the federal and state governments, and customary international norms cannot override the intent of our legislators.” The court opined that “the power to recognize international obligations [was] vested in both the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, not to the courts or the state governments.”

West Virginia

In Pauley v. Kelly the West Virginia Supreme Court, addressing the constitutionality of a financing scheme for public schools, invoked the UDHR in support of its holding that “education is a fundamental right of every American.” The court cited the UDHR in its review of other state and federal courts’ analyses of the right to education, pointing to the UDHR as part of the “embarrassing abundance of authority” on the topic.

330. Id. at 539.
331. Id. at 540.
333. Id.
334. Id.
336. Id. at 679.
Part III: Conclusion

Recommendations for a State Court Human Rights Strategy

The survey reveals that courts have most frequently addressed international human rights in death penalty cases, when defendants argue that the ICCPR or customary international law prohibits capital punishment. Other than in the juvenile death penalty context, these arguments have proven largely unsuccessful. Courts either have accepted U.S. Senate reservations to human rights treaties uncritically or, in some instances, have simply refused to adjudicate human rights defenses. A more promising area for the development of international human rights jurisprudence is in civil lawsuits. As the survey shows, some state courts have started to look to human rights principles to help define state constitutional or statutory guarantees, and there are openings for further development of the law in this manner.

As one scholar noted, while courts have proven “reluctant to view themselves as bound directly by international human rights principles on substantive issues, they are much more willing to invoke such principles—whether embodied in treaties or in other manifestations of customary international law—to guide the interpretation of domestic legal norms.” 337 Scholars have repeatedly argued: “This ‘indirect incorporation’ of international human rights law continues to be a promising approach warranting greater attention and increased use by human rights advocates.” 338

State court litigators should therefore consider using international human rights standards as interpretive guides for state constitutional and statutory rights whenever strategically possible. Invoking international human rights law as an interpretive guide, while relying on state law for the rule of decision, has several advantages. It insulates decisions from review by the U.S. Supreme Court and makes them more resistant to removal to federal court. 339 State courts can thus safely develop their own jurisprudence of international human rights without the possibility that federal courts will intervene and frustrate the project altogether. An “indirect incorporation” approach also allows state courts to circumnavigate the self-execution doctrine and reservations to treaties that otherwise may limit treaties’ impact. These limitations are less relevant when state courts are not asked to apply treaties as governing law.

Moreover, the development of a jurisprudence in which human rights law plays a subsidiary but important interpretive role may encourage state courts, which have limited familiarity with such law, to examine international sources of obligation more frequently. As state courts become more familiar with international human rights law, they may prove more willing to adjudicate a violation of international human rights law standing alone, without having to rely on analogous standards in state law for the rules of decision. And over time, as international human rights principles become more integrated into state law, courts will define rights more broadly and will hold government accountable for enforcing those rights, expanding opportunity for all Americans.

337. Strossen, supra note 2, at 824.
339. See, e.g., Paul Hoffman, The Application of International Human Rights Law in State Courts: A View from California, 18 Int’l Lawyer 61 (1984) (”Another advantage of using human rights law as an interpretive device rather than arguing that it is binding on the state court as treaty or customary law is that a California decision which adopts a human rights norm to interpret California law cannot be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court; it is insulated from Supreme Court review because there is an ‘independent state ground’ for the decision.”).